



























Abstract: this paper introduces a notion of exploitation according to which participants in a cooperative 
production process are exploited to the extent that their earnings coincide with what they would earn from 
independent participation in the production process. This notion is then used to show that, in general, the 
institutional structure of production is not the solution to the problem of (opportunistic) exploitation, but may 
instead be the condition itself for its occurrence. Starting from the observation that surplus-value is almost 
always created by the collective undertaking of non additively separable investments, the key to the result is 
to take groups as units of analysis in a Marx-inspired framework driven by the evolutionary principle of 
differential, multilevel profit realization. 
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In a quite frequently quoted passage from the chapter on cooperation in 
the first book of Capital, Marx wrote: ’The labourer is the owner of his labour-
power until he has done bargaining for its sale with the capitalist; and he can 
sell no more than what he has, i.e., his individual, isolated labour-power. This 
state of things is in no way altered by the fact that the capitalist, instead of 
buying the labour-power of one man, buys that of 100, and enters into separate 
contracts with 100 unconnected men instead of with one. […]. He pays them 
the value of 100 independent labour-powers, but he does not pay for the 
combined labour-power of the hundred.’ (Marx, 1867, pp. 332-333, emphasis 
added). 
Though not based on the labor theory of value nor aimed at determining 
‘natural’ prices and abolish markets, this paper will argue that such a notion of 
exploitation – participants in a cooperative production process are exploited to 
the extent that their earnings coincide with what they would earn from 
independent participation in the production process, whereas exploiters are 
those who are able to appropriate the surplus from cooperation by controlling 
the production process – is largely consistent with the spirit of Marx’s critique 
of the theory and practice of capitalistic production and, most importantly, with 
past and present actual forms of the institutional structure of production (firms 
and markets; see Coase, 1992).
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1 According to the labor theory of value, cooperation – as a consequence of what in 
contemporary terminology are termed increasing returns, peer effects and complementary 
efforts – is just one of the two main ways to decrease the value of subsistence wages so as to 
increase surplus-labor, surplus-value and exploitation (the other being the introduction of 
‘machinery’). When the focus of analysis shifts from price determination to the organization of 
production, however, Marx’s view of cooperation deepens. When discussing the evolution of 
capitalism from peasant agriculture and independent handicraft, a point which will be crucially 
emphasized also in the paper, he observes that ‘capitalistic cooperation does not present itself 
as a particular historical form of cooperation, but cooperation itself appears to be a historical 
form peculiar to, and specifically distinguishing, the capitalistic process of production.’ (Marx, 
1867, p. 334). This observation prompted the perception of the difference between the division 
of labor carried out by the market and the division of labor carried out within the firm: ‘But, in 
spite of numerous analogies and links connecting them, division of labour in the interior of a 
society, and that in the interior of a workshop, differ not only in degree but also in kind (…). 
For instance, the cattle breeder produces the hides, the tanner makes the hides into leather, and 
the shoemaker, the leather into boots. (…). Now it is quite possible to imagine, with Adam 
Smith, that the difference between the above social division of labour and the division in 
manufacture is merely subjective, exists merely for the observer (…). But what is it that forms 
the bond between the independent labours of the cattle breeder, the tanner, and the shoemaker? 
It is the fact that their respective products are commodities. What, on the other hand, 
characterizes division of labour in manufactures? The fact that the detail labourer produces no   2
In modern terminology, the key analytical tool with which to illustrate 
the argument is the notion of team production, famously developed by Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) to characterize the fact that capitalist production almost 
always takes place in forms which are not representable in terms of additively 
separable production functions. In other words, as implied by the above 
quotation from Marx, with team production the total product is larger (or 
better) than the sum of separable outputs from each cooperating individual, but 
‘[t]here is no longer anything which we can call the natural reward of 
individual labour. Each labourer produces only some part of a whole, and each 
part, having no value or utility in itself, there is nothing on which the labourer 
can seize, and say: It is my product; this I will keep to myself’ (Hodgskin, 
1825, p. 85; quoted in Marx, 1867, p.355).  
Viewing the surplus-value creation process as essentially investment-
driven, the theoretical contribution of this paper is that it applies such a notion 
to investments. Production processes can be therefore classified as in figure 1, 
according to whether cooperation creates a surplus with respect to independent 
production both ex ante and ex post, ex ante but not ex post, ex post but not ex 
ante, or neither ex ante nor ex post.
2   
It is also shown by the figure that the logic of exchange among given 
individuals is best suited to analysis of only one case out of the possible four, 
namely the one where the production process requires investments which are 
separable both ex ante and ex post (fig.1, case a). Corresponding to the 
apparently institution-free framework of general competitive analysis, this is 
indeed the only case where, with the sole requirement of perfect competition, 
the institutional structure of production can be interpreted in terms of the 
optimal incentive condition involving the full appropriation of the fruits of 
individuals’ own efforts. By independently specializing according to 
comparative advantage individuals can fully realize the gains from trade and, 
maintaining the radically methodologically individualistic approach to surplus-
                                                                                                                                 
commodities. It is only the common product of all the detail labourers that becomes a 
commodity.’ (Marx, 1867, p. 354). In this sense, placing the legendary pin-making example in 
the right context, he anticipated the possible superiority of the firm with respect to the market 
as a mechanism with which to organize production, as well as the issues of coordination and 
power within the firm. However, especially as regards the co-existence of markets and firms, 
or in other words appreciation of the organizational virtues of output markets in correcting 
disequilibrium situations ex post, the way in which he did so is not sufficiently consistent, as 
shown by the two envisaged stages of ‘single-firm socialism’ and ‘anti-firm communism’. See 
Pagano (1985, ch. 3; 2007). Parts of the chapters in Capital on which this paper draws are also 
reprinted in Putternam and Krozner (1996, ch. 4).   
2 Recalling the definition of investment as the current employment of resources to increase 
future production, the ex ante period is the period before the decisions taken become operative, 
while the ex post period is the period after the decisions taken become operative. Throughout 
the paper, these two periods will also be called inception (t=0) and realization (t=1).   3
value creation and realization, the logic of an exchange economy successfully 
applies to production. 
In the other three cases, however, since (technological and 
organizational) cost minimization implies that investments must be undertaken 
collectively at least at some stage but contracts are incomplete, the three issues 
of the rules governing the division of labor and the distribution of surplus-
value within the firm, and of their enforcement, are raised.
3 
In this respect, the paper offers an alternative to the new-institutional 
literature making ‘operational’ Coase’s insight that the institutional structure of 
production can be explained in terms of an efficient ‘meta-exchange’ of 
property rights.  
In general, indeed, when surplus-value is created by the collective 
undertaking of non separable investments, the actual conditions under which 
such a surplus can be realized severely limit the applicability of the principle of 
individual contribution as a positive principle. Exploitation, therefore, should 
not be taken to mean the lack of correspondence between individual 
contributions and individual rewards as in its other traditional meaning, 
stemming from the subjective ‘neo-classical’ tradition and informing, under 
more stringent assumptions, the new-institutional literature. By contrast, as 
implied by the definition given at the outset, it can be taken to mean a lack of 
inter-subjectively defined rules on sharing the fruits generated by the team 
characteristics of the production process.
4  
                                                 
3 Strategic complementarity is taken to be the main determinant of non separability so that 
organizational costs are mainly equated with coordination costs. Contractual incompleteness, 
which represents the institutional side of non separability, is to be taken in its usual meaning, 
and is the main reason why it makes a difference to assume given individuals or making room 
for their co-evolutionary interaction with institutions. See Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, ch.2 for 
the theoretical difficulty of distinguishing between technological and organizational costs, ch.4 
for coordination costs, and ch. 5 for contractual incompleteness. 
4 A notion of exploitation very close to the one adopted by this paper  has also been found in 
Marx by Elster who, after the quotation at the beginning, cites the following passage: ‘In my 
presentation, the earnings on capital are not in fact “only a deduction or ‘robbery’ of the 
worker”. On the contrary, I present the capitalist as a necessary functionary of capitalistic 
production, and show at length that he does not only “deduct” or “rob” but forces the 
production of surplus value, and thus helps create what is deduct; (…).’ (Marx, 1977, p. 382, 
quoted in Elster, 1985, p.225). Exploitation therefore occurs because, for example: ‘(…) a 
skilled manager should be rewarded for the actual work of bringing workers together, not for 
the work done by those whom he assembles.’ (Elster, 1985, p. 226). According to Elster, this 
would imply that Marx, contrary to what he himself explicitly states, had a theory of justice 
and that exploitation is unjust because it violates the principle of contribution, the (‘socialist’) 
second-best principle hierarchically inferior only to the (‘communist’) need principle. Even as 
a principle of justice, however, Elster concludes that a notion of exploitation based on the 
labor theory of value fails to evade the well-known measurement difficulties. In this respect, 
notice that relinquishing the labor theory of value for a view of the surplus-value creation   4
Accordingly, under the conditions studied by the paper, it will be 
shown that the institutional structure of production is not the solution to the 
problem of (opportunistic) exploitation but may be the condition itself for its 
occurrence, particularly in situations which, in a fully methodologically 
individualistic framework, may look like competitive equilibria with free-entry 
and full employment (fig. 1, case c; proposition 3, first part).  
Moreover, as a consequence of the weakness of the principle of 
individual contribution as a positive principle, even the marginal theory of 
distribution – whether the margin of analysis is defined in terms of 
commodities or, more conveniently, in terms of individuals (Makowski and 
Ostroy, 2001) – will prove to be undermined, so that the ‘classical’ issues of its 
inherently conflictual character, and of the difference between exchange and 
production, will be re-dis-covered.
5  
Obtained in a framework where individuals and institutions co-evolve 
in response to exogenous technological conditions and, possibly, to the 
endogenous rupture of shared understandings about the relationship between 
actions and outcomes, such results naturally also pave the way for 
acknowledgment of the effects of existing distribution policies, reducing the 
level of abstraction of the reasoning proposed and adding new arguments for 
their qualification as efficiency-enhancing.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section, after 
making the case for the methodology employed, details the contents of figure 1 
and strengthens the links with the related literature. The corresponding results 
are set out in the form of propositions in sub-section 2.1. and discussed in sub-
section 2.2. Section 3 provides past and present applications to the institutional 
structure of production (and distribution). Section 4 briefly concludes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
process as being almost always due to cooperation in no way obscures conflict in the 
workplace as the last quotation from Marx implies, but it does mean abandoning the idea that 
reality is driven by ‘natural’ laws based on objective (physically comparable) measures of 
value. In this sense, Marx’s critique of ‘Ricardian socialists’ as unscientific may have been 
influenced by the positivistic climate of his times. See footnote 13. 
5 That production and exchange differ in nature because the former is concerned with flow 
variables and the latter with stock variables has also been emphasized by the neo-Ricardian 
literature (see Pasinetti, 1977). In this paper, the difference has less to do with the issue of 
scarcity vs reproducibility than with that of independence vs (inter-) dependence. By 
definition, indeed, with strategic complementarity the whole is not the sum of its parts because 






2. Individuals and institutional rules between methodological 
individualism and holistic structuralism   
 
Reversing the order followed in the Introduction, this section initially 
abstracts from the case of independent production (fig. 1, case a), and 
postpones its full discussion until sub-section 2.2.  
The reasoning is as follows (fig. 2). When surplus-value is created by 
the collective undertaking of non separable investments – an apparently 
ubiquitous situation since otherwise we would not observe such extremely 
costly organizations as firms – an observer may be confronted by a population 
of groups, each consisting of the individuals who belong to it and of the 
institutional rules that govern its external relationships with other groups 
(inter-group relationships), and the internal relationships among group 
members (intra-group relationships).  
By pursuing a not fully explored path between methodological 
individualism and holistic structuralism – that is, by seeking not to explain 
institutions in terms of given individuals or individual behaviors in terms of 
given institutions – the paper takes groups as the units of analysis in a multi-
level competition framework where between-group competition and within-

















(a)  (c) 
(d)   6
determine inter-group relationships (maximizing group value subject to an 
individual participation constraint ensuring that investments are made), and 
intra-group relationships (maximizing the intra-group decision-maker’s share 
of the surplus, given the other group members’ outside options).  
More precisely, exogenous technology conditions (i.e., the type of 
investments depicted in fig. 1) determine the nature of inter-group 
relationships, these being defined as the rules that govern the process by which 
groups form, interact with each other, and become extinct.
6 Providing for the 
conditions under which the requisite investments can be undertaken at 
minimum cost, they can be shown to be determined according to the group 
value maximizing the pressure of between-group competition. In other words, 
groups that fail to conform to the right type of inter-group relationships do not 
minimize technological and organizational costs and are therefore assumed to 
disappear.
7 
                                                 
6The three types of inter-group relationships considered in the paper are termed conflictual, 
fission-fusion with commitment, and fission-fusion without commitment. According to the 
timing structure described in footnote 2, these terms mean, respectively, that productive groups 
form, interact with each other, and become extinct through mutual assimilation or absorption 
(never ceasing to exist as groups), through a two-period (rule-based) association of single 
individuals, or through a one-period (unregulated) association of single individuals. I adapt this 
terminology from evolutionary group selection models in biology, anthropology and 
economics, which also pioneered the formal modeling of the co-evolution between individual 
preferences such as social preferences and reproductive leveling (within-group) institutions 
such as food sharing and monogamy (see, respectively, Sober and Wilson, 1998, Einrich, 
2004, and Bowles et al., 2003). Intended to explain non selfish cooperation, such models 
illuminate the conditions under which group selection may prevail over individual selection.  
Intuitively, this may happen when the between-group trait variance is higher than the within-
group trait variance (in the extreme case of no inter-group variation, there is no role for group 
selection, whereas in the opposite case of no intra-group variation there is no role for 
individual selection). Inter-group relationships, therefore, are important parameters in such 
models because they determine the extent of variation among groups. For instance, whilst 
fission-fusion inter-group relationships are helpful in biological evolution because, unless 
groups periodically recombine, the selfish type will ultimately prevail within the group, 
conflictual  inter-group relationships accelerate cultural evolution because the more successful 
(and more altruist) groups can spread through conquest and assimilation. In a recent paper, 
Bowles (2006) even shows that, in the case of humans, lethal inter-group competition may 
have been an important force even in genetic evolution (without implying that a genetic 
predisposition for altruism actually exists, nor diminishing the importance of culturally 
transmitted traits). Rather than exogenously determining the relative strength of within-group 
competition and between-group competition, which are assumed to operate simultaneously and 
in opposite directions,  in this paper inter-group relationships endogenously depend on 
technology (they are institutional rules), and (through their effect on intra-group relationships) 
they determine whether or not such forces, considered sequentially, push the system in same 
direction.  
7 This is a rather extreme assumption that ignores the factors, such as tacit knowledge, 
cumulative learning and path-dependence, emphasized by the evolutionary theory of the firm   7
Inter-group relationships have a twofold role. On the one hand, because 
they are the rules through which groups interact, they amount to a given regime 
of surplus-value realization, that is, the regime under which profit can be 
realized. Indeed, the three cases initially analyzed, corresponding to conflictual 
inter-group relationships, to fission-fusion with commitment inter-group 
relationships, and to fission-fusion without commitment inter-group 
relationships, will be respectively called a between-group competition push (as 
when profit derives from appropriating resources from other groups), a 
between-group opportunity pull (as when profit derives from niche 
competition), and a within-group competition push (as when profit derives 
from appropriating occasional benefits from cooperation).
8 
On the other hand, because inter-group relationships are the rules 
through which groups become extinct, they are assumed fully to determine 
who the (next period) intra-group decision-makers are (i.e., property rights and 
the associated  sustaining beliefs system)
9. The decision-makers’ value 
maximizing pressure of within-group competition hence determines intra-
group relationships, these being defined as the rules and the enforcement 
mechanisms governing the division of labor and the distribution of surplus-
value within the group.  In other words, as said, decision makers manage the 
production process so as to maximize their share of the surplus taking account 
of the other group members’ outside options
10.   
                                                                                                                                 
in order to accommodate the variety of existing organizational forms in spite of competition 
(see Hodgson, 1998b, and the literature therein). It is a consequence of the already mentioned 
high level of abstraction in the assumed operation of the multi-level competition framework, 
where between-group competition determines what groups look like from the outside, leaving 
the task of establishing how they are internally organized to within-group competition. As will 
be seen shortly, however, the actual way in which groups compete with each other (i.e., market 
structure) is endogenous, so that organizational variety is associated with (and limited) to 
differences among industries. See also Alchian, 1950, and the discussion at the end of section 
3. 
8 I take from Ghiselin (1995) the terms ‘competition push’ and ‘opportunity pull’, which he 
uses to represent the possible sources of division of labor induced ‘progress’ in evolutionary 
biology. The first occurs with: ‘(…) one species ‘wedging’ another out of its place.’ (p.1034), 
the second when:’New places are created, and occupied (…).’ (ibid.). In the language of game 
theory they correspond, respectively, to a pure conflict game (every outcome is Pareto-
efficient) and to a pure common interest game (there is only one Pareto-efficient outcome).     
9 Again, this is not an entirely realistic assumption because it overlooks the role of individual 
natural differences, the cornerstone of the logic of exchange. It is made precisely to highlight 
the institutional macro-foundations of individuals. 
10 See Veherencamp (1983) for a similar characterization of the within-group situation. In her 
model, where she studies the despotic versus the egalitarian character of animal societies, 
subordinates’ outside options are captured by the cost of dispersal, whilst the fitness 
‘production function’ depends on group size (the dominant individual choice variable). 
Roughly, such a within-group situation is also the framework for the Marxian approaches to 
the emergence of the firm (e.g., Marglin, 1974). In this respect, the basic difference is that in   8
Accordingly, intra-group relationships will be finally distinguished 
according to two basic features. The first is whether they are hierarchical or 
egalitarian, both in the organizational sense of how decisions are taken (by fiat 
or by consensus), and in the distributional sense of how surplus is distributed 
(by appropriating or sharing). The second is whether they are decentralized or 
centralized, in the sense of whether or not recruitment occurs in the presence of 






In sum, individuals affect institutions, so that the latter turn out to be 
micro-founded (the individual participation constraint for inter-group 
relationships and the within-group interaction among individuals for intra-
group relationships), and institutions affect individuals, so that the latter turn 
out to be macro-founded (property rights and the beliefs system ensuring they 
are self-enforcing are determined by inter-group relationships). In other words, 
the perspective adopted amounts to taking the point of view of an individual 
who is neither the beginning nor the end of the analysis. Instead, he is ‘caught 
in the middle’, with higher-level causal mechanisms (in their turn the outcome 
of many individual actions) operating, as it were, ‘behind his back’. This ‘real 
man’ perspective echoing the opening sentence of Marx’s Critique of Political 
Economy
11, together with the full recognition of inter-group relationships as 
                                                                                                                                 
the present context structure-induced power asymmetries are not the exogenous drivers of the 
whole argument, with the non trivial implication that a change in property rights, as a 
consequence of adopted view of the surplus-value creation process, does not automatically 
produce the intended changes in technology and individuals.  
11‘In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable 















competition   9
institutional rules, is the reason why the multi-level competition framework is 
assumed to work differently from the received approach of the group selection 
literature (see footnote 6). 
 
2.1. The institutional structure of (collective) production and distribution 
 
Equipped with the above methodological and terminological material, 
we are now in a position to state and demonstrate the three propositions needed 
to derive the results anticipated in figure 1. Before doing so, however, it is 
useful to specify the timing structure and, for the sake of simplicity, setting 
aside the relationship between price and quantity decisions.   
 
TIMING: individuals live only the two periods necessary for the investment 
process, the ex ante period (t=0) and the ex post period (t=1), but leave their 
status (wealth and skills) to their (one for each) offspring. 
 
ASSUMPTION 1: production is assumed to consist of producing a single 
item.  
 
ASSUMPTION 2: investments are always worth undertaking (demand prices 
guarantee a surplus-value with respect to independent investments). 
PROPOSITION 1: when the best investments are non separable either ex ante 
or ex post, inter-group relationships are conflictual, the surplus-value 
realization process is a between-group competition push, and intra-group 
relationships are hierarchical and centralized (fig.3, box to the upper left).  
                                                                                                                                 
of the development of their productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society (…) to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. (…). At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of 
society enter into contradiction with the existing relations of production, or –what is but a legal 
expression for the same thing- with the property relations within which they have been at work 
hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters.’ (Marx, 1859, pp. 8-9). As shown by the role given to the micro-foundations of 
institutions, this of course is not to make the nonsensical claim that the latter are not made up 
of individuals. In this respect, Marx was in fact anticipating the evolutionary notion of 
unintended consequences subsequently contrasted to the notion of conscious design embraced 
by the ‘state of nature’ tradition. Perhaps not very originally, this historically-minded relation 
of mutual determination between individuals and institutions, which Marx conceived in terms 
of dialectics but can now also be construed in terms of co-evolution, is in my view the most 
enduring legacy of his contribution to social theory. Relatedly, and to anticipate the results 
somewhat, note the quotation-illustrated possibility of stable inefficient equilibria stemming 
from the self-reinforcing interaction between ‘productive forces’ (technology) and ‘relations of 
production’ (property rights).. The point has also been made by Pagano (1991) in order to 
provide an alternative explanation for the variety of existing capitalistic organizations.  See 
also Hodgson, 1998a.   10
 
When the most productive investments create a surplus with respect to 
independent investments both ex ante and ex post (fig.1, case d), they can 
never profitably stay independently on the market but, as a consequence of 
technological and organizational non separability, they must be undertaken 
collectively in both the inception and realization periods (with the introduction 
of a new machine and on the job training, for example). Hence, owing to 
strategic complementarity, the identity of the parties is relevant both before and 
after decisions become operative. Accordingly, since groups must be in place 
at  0 = t  and last until 1 = t , the group value maximizing pressure of between-
group competition implies that cost minimizing groups emerge from 
conflictual inter-group relationships (groups form and become extinct through 
mutual assimilation or absorption, never dissolving into their individual 
constituent parts).  
Consequently, the surplus-value realization process consists of appropriating 
resources from other groups (a between-group competition push as when profit 
derives from price competition), while intra-group relationships are 
hierarchical and centralized. The pressure of within-group competition 
induces the decision maker, (the offspring of) the winner of the previous 
conflict, to take control of the entire investment process, and to appropriate the 
entire surplus. Subordinates, given their ‘unconnected’ beliefs, are therefore 
left with what they can get from totally independent participation in the 
production process (subsistence wages, to anticipate the literal application in 
the next section). Recruitment, on the other hand, is centralized because it does 
not occur in the presence of equally attractive outside options, and, in this 
sense, the entire situation can be said to imply coercion.
12 
                                                 
12 I use the term ‘coercion’ to denote a situation where subordinates have no outside options 
and cannot undertake any of the investments by themselves, but of course physical coercion is 
not implied. A fortiori, this is true of the situation where subordinates have outside options but 
cannot begin or realize the investment independently (propositions 2 and 3), where I use the 
term ‘force’. Even so, because they follow from power asymmetries in the sense that one party 
is provided with the money and the skills for an autonomous participation in the production 
process while the other, lacking them, can only enjoy a heteronomous participation, it seems to 
me that such situations are substantially different from the one in which individuals have 
outside options and, most importantly, are able to make the investment by themselves both at 
inception and realization, justifying the Marx-inspired attempt to look for what is hidden under 
the cover of the formal logic of exchange among given individuals. Of course, as shown by its 
time-honored tradition in philosophy and politics, as well as in economics, this logic is by no 
means wrong, for it is always possible to find a counter-factual situation with respect to which 
any observed institutional arrangement can be seen as a result of Pareto-efficient exchanges in 
an appropriately defined state of nature. As the quotation from Mokyr (2002) in the next 
section makes clear, however, the problem is that this may not be always relevant to 
understanding what actually happens in the real world. A thoughtful and famous, but not 
sufficiently influential, critique of Pareto-efficiency has been conducted by Calabresi (1991).   11
 
PROPOSITION 2: when the best investments are non separable ex ante but 
are separable ex post, inter-group relationships are fission-fusion with 
commitment, the surplus-value realization process is a between-group 
opportunity pull, and intra-group relationships are egalitarian and decentralized 
(fig.3, box in the middle). 
 
When the most productive investments create a surplus with respect to 
independent investments ex ante but not ex post (fig.1, case b), they must be 
undertaken collectively at inception but can be realized independently – as, for 
instance, when the direction of knowledge development is set by the scientific 
community but innovations can be made by individual researchers. In this case, 
the identity of the parties matters before the decisions taken become operative 
but not afterwards, so that groups must be in place at  0 = t but not at  1 = t  (in 
the absence of the team production feature, technological and organizational 
costs are minimized with self-organizing producers). Hence, the group value 
maximizing pressure of between-group competition implies that the most 
successful groups emerge from fission-fusion with commitment inter-group 
relationships (groups continuously form and disband into their constituent parts 
through a rule-based association of single individuals covering both periods).  
The surplus value realization process thus involves between-group niche 
competition (a between-group opportunity pull, as when profit derives from 
product differentiation, for example), while intra-group relationships are 
egalitarian and decentralized. The commitment being intended to prevent 
would-be dominant individuals from appropriating the entire surplus by 
realizing the investment independently (as exemplified by the non compete 
clauses commonly used in partnerships, to anticipate an application from the 
next section), nobody is provided ex ante with the money and the skills for an 
autonomous participation in the production process, so that the decision-maker 
is the whole group. On the one hand, the investment process is therefore 
regulated by a consensual decision making enforced by ‘connected’ beliefs, 
while the surplus-value is shared according to inter-subjectively defined rules 
(and, within the constraints of commitment to autharchy, everybody is 
autonomous ex post).
13 On the other hand, recruitment is decentralized in the 
                                                                                                                                 
Recent studies which forgo the logic of exchange are Piccione and Rubistein (2006), and 
Acemoglou et al. (2005), while that logic is applied to the ‘dark side of force’ by the literature 
known as the economics of conflict (Hirshleifer, 2001). 
13As always, egalitarianism is not to be understood as perfect equality, and there is room for 
conceiving rewards and punishments as attenuating the depressing effect on individual 
incentives. The point is the inter-subjective nature of the process by which possibly different 
shares of the surplus are allocated to group members. The already cited Hodgskin (1825, p.83) 
puts the matter in the following terms when figuring out the rules of just distribution in his   12
sense that previous groups regularly disband into their constituent parts and the 
new ones are formed by single individuals ‘choosing’ among equally attractive 
outside options.  
 
PROPOSITION 3: when the best investments are separable ex ante but not ex 
post, and the (net) value of a truncated investment of this kind is higher than 
the (net) value of the available investments separable both ex ante and ex post, 
inter-group relationships are fission-fusion without commitment, the surplus 
value realization process is a within-group competition push, and intra-group 
relationships are hierarchical and decentralized. Otherwise, proposition 2 
applies (fig.3, box to the lower right).  
 
When the most productive investments create a surplus with respect to 
independent investments ex post but not ex ante (fig. 1, case c), they can be 
undertaken independently at inception but must be realized collectively – as, 
for instance, when a given product is designed and assembled. The identity of 
the parties, in this case, matters only after the decision taken becomes 
operative, while it may or may not matter before, the outcome depending on 
whether or not the above condition holds. If it does (as may be the case with 
subsidized middle-level education or immigration, for example), since groups 
must only be in place at  1 = t , the pressure of between-group competition 
implies that the most successful groups arise from fission-fusion without 
commitment inter-group relationships (groups form and disband through a one-
period unregulated association of single individuals). 
In this case the surplus-value realization process amounts to appropriating 
occasional benefits from cooperation (a within-group competition push – as 
when profit derives from squeezing the share of the other group members), 
while intra-group relationships are hierarchical and decentralized. Decision-
makers are (the offspring of) previously successful surplus-takers and the 
pressure of within-group competition drives them to dominate realization of 
the investments and to appropriate the surplus. Subordinates, in effect, have no 
reason to expect better terms elsewhere, but they cannot undertake the 
                                                                                                                                 
anarchic, ‘utopian’ socialist society: ’There is no principle or rule, as far as I know, for 
dividing the produce of joint labour among the different individuals who concur in production, 
but the judgment of the individuals themselves; that judgment depending on the value men 
may set on different species of labour can never be known, nor can any rule be given for its 
application by any single person.’.  Shortly afterwards, he singles out the conditions under 
which market-based distribution would be acceptable:’If all kinds of labour were perfectly 
free, if no unfounded prejudice invested some parts, and perhaps the least useful, of the social 
task with great honour, while other parts are very improperly branded with disgrace, there 
would no difficulty on this point, and the wages of individual labour would be justly settled by 
what Dr. Smith calls the “haggling of the market.”.’ (ibid., pp. 85-86, emphasis added).    13
investment independently and so, again because of their ‘unconnected’ beliefs, 
are forced to accept being paid the value of their truncated investment (given 
the surplus-value realization process, they do not get more, while, owing to the 
above condition, they do not get less).
14 In this case too, finally, recruitment is 
decentralized because new groups are formed by individuals coming from the 
independent investments period, so that they still ‘choose’ the group among 
equally attractive outside options.  
If, conversely, the above condition does not hold (as may be the case 
with costly elitarian education, for example), the pressure of between-group 
competition implies that the most successful groups arise from fission-fusion 
with commitment inter-group relationships, so that Proposition 2 applies (the 
only difference being that they form at t=1 with the commitment implicitly 
covering t=0, instead of being formed at t=0 with the commitment explicitly 
covering t=1).  
 
                                                 
14Of course, the most probable situation is one of subordinates in excess supply, so that the 
standard argument of the ‘reserve army’ applies. Remarkably, however, the situation is 
theoretically consistent with free entry and full employment (after which the independent 
sector is empty and the condition given in the text becomes meaningless, prompting a change 
in the resulting inter-group relationships and the associated surplus-value realization process). 
With fission-fusion without commitment inter-group relationships and a within-group 
competition push surplus-value realization process, in fact, groups are so ephemeral that, no 
matter how much entry is free, between-group competition does not wipe out profits, which 
stand instead in an inverse relation with wages because of within-group competition. If 
anything, the problem is why more egalitarian (and more efficient) groups do not emerge, and 
the simple answer is that, as long as the condition of the text holds, they are more costly.    14
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2.2. Discussion: the role of inter-group relationships in institutional 
analysis 
 
Contrast the above results with the fourth possible case, the one in 
which the most productive investments are separable both ex ante and ex post 
(fig. 1, case a). Clearly, in this case the identity of the parties does not matter at 
any stage of the investment process and no surplus is created by cooperation. 
Hence investments must be undertaken independently both at inception and 
realization (as in traditional agriculture or craftsmanship, for example). 
Obviously, therefore, groups never form, and inter-group relationships collapse 
into intra-group relationships.  
As a consequence, to the extent that ‘complete’, spot market intra-
group relationships successfully restrain natural anti-competitive tendencies 
(corporativism and monopolistic pricing, for example), the surplus-value 
realization process is a within-group opportunity pull (profit is the value of 
individual contribution). Accordingly, the institutional structure of production 
and distribution can be fully rationalized as a way to ensure that individual   15
rewards coincide with the value of individual contribution, which in its turn is 
determined by what individuals can command elsewhere. Naturally, the 
situation is unfortunately (and possibly unfairly) consistent with some 
individuals appropriating all the gains from trade, but to the extent that this 
kind of investment is worth undertaking, every individual has the appropriate 
incentives to make. In sum, as importantly shown by the Fundamental Welfare 
Theorems, distribution has no impact on efficiency, and, as equally importantly 
implied by Samuelson’s (1957, p. 894) statement that in general competitive 
equilibrium ‘it does not really matter who hires whom’, neither power nor 
conflict is involved. 
This is not the case when surplus-value is created by the collective 
undertaking of non separable investments. Depending on the nature of inter-
group relationships and the associated surplus-value realization process, there 
may be a tension between the group value maximizing pressure of between-
group competition and the decision-maker’s value maximizing pressure of 
within-group competition. When this is the case – that is, when the group is 
divided between decision-makers and subordinates – the investment process is 
managed (in toto or in part) to maximize the former’s share of the surplus, and 
the latter are left with what they can get from independent participation in the 
production process (implying inefficiency and exploitation, proposition 1 and 
proposition 3, first part). When this is not the case – that is, when the decision-
maker is the whole group – the investment process is managed to maximize the 
profit of the group and individual shares are determined according to inter-
subjectively defined sharing rules (possibly implying efficiency without 
exchange among individuals, proposition 2 and proposition 3, second part).  
In no case can the institutional structure of production be explained in 
terms of an efficient alignment between individual contributions and individual 
rewards as in the new-institutional literature’s stretching of the logic of 
exchange. The result owes as much to the dropping of the assumption of no 
wealth effects as it does to the dropping of a partial equilibrium perspective.  
When there are no wealth effects, as is especially the case for the hold-
up literature on vertical integration (see Williamson, 1985, for transaction cost 
economics, and Hart, 1995, for the incomplete contracts approach), groups can 
be treated like single individuals and inter-group relationships again collapse 
into intra-group relationships. The surplus-value realization process can thus 
be brought once again under the comfortable blanket of the conceptual 
framework of a within-group opportunity pull, and (hierarchical) intra-group 
relationships can be seen as a solution to the incentive-depressing lack of 
coincidence between individual contributions and individual rewards deriving 
from opportunistic behavior. When the situation is that of a single group faced 
with the prospect of enjoying the advantages of team production, as is 
especially the case for the free-riding literature pioneered by Alchian and   16
Demsetz’s 1972 paper (see also Alchian, 1987), inter-group relationships fall 
outside the analysis from the outset and, again, intra-group relationships (the 
emergence of a centralized monitor specializing in metering individual 
productivity on the organizational side, and the inversion of the market-based 
relationships between productivity and rewards on the distributional side) can 
be thought of as a way to reinstall a within-group opportunity pull, overcoming 
the complications arising from team production
15.  
In addition, crucial in both cases is ‘[t]he presumption that “In principle 
there were markets” (…).’, as Williamson (1985, p. 87) puts it. Ex ante, this 
general competitive equilibrium ‘state of nature’ with given individuals is the 
tool necessary to evaluate comparative advantages and guarantee that property 
rights flow to those who are able to make the most efficient use of them. Ex 
post, though the details of the process are not the focus of the analysis (see 
Battistini, 2001), competition guarantees that the ensuing power positions are 
not abused. So the famous statement that ‘Economics has gained the title 
Queen of Social Sciences by choosing solved political problems as its domain’ 
(Lerner, 1972, p. 259) is confirmed while the equally famous metaphor of a 
competitive economy composed of ‘islands of conscious power in this ocean of 
unconscious cooperation’ (Robertson, 1923, p. 85) is borne out.   
However, to the extent that a surplus-value realization process 
consisting of a within-group opportunity pull and the associated principle of 
individual contribution as a positive principle are of limited practical relevance 
(though highly attractive were they true), more than a simple shift from the 
exchange of commodities to the exchange of property rights is required to 
provide a full explanation of the institutional structure of production.
16  On the 
                                                 
15 Because of its role in the paper, let me show how the framework proposed undermines  the 
Alchian and Demsetz’s monitor solution. Though the real world observation that monitoring is 
actually performed by fixed wage workers and, increasingly, by cheap technical devices 
should be sufficient, this is also the opportunity to discuss the enforcement of the rules 
governing the division of labor within the group (with recruitment enforcing the rules 
governing the distribution of the surplus). When inter-group relationships and the associated 
surplus-value realization process are such that intra-group relationships are hierarchical, the 
dominant individuals can take the desired amount of effort from subordinates by direct 
monitoring, so that the solution is disrupted by the (exploitation-driven) monitors. When inter-
group relationships and the associated surplus-value realization process are such that intra-
group relationships are egalitarian, punishment of violations of the group’s norms can be 
decentralized to the group members, so that the solution is disrupted by the (sharing-driven) 
monitored. Inter-subjectively defined sharing rules, indeed, mean that costs and benefits of a 
particular task crucially depend on the agreement of the other group members. Not 
surprisingly, in other words, outside the state of nature the collective action problem is more 
often than not solved by (endogenous) power relationships. 
16 As demonstrated by empirical analysis of vertical integration (Joskov, 1985), outside 
vanishing independent sectors, the individualistic treatment of groups can be insightful when   17
other hand, to the extent that the same type of criticism can be made of the 
opposite, conflict-based mono-causal approach, an analysis aimed at such an 
explanation cannot even be based on given power structures.  Accordingly, the 
perspective developed in the previous section can be seen as an attempt to 
develop a general framework where the case of pure conflict (the world Marx 
was living in) and the case of no conflict (the ‘win-win’ theoretical 
attractiveness of exchange) are important special cases. Since in effect neither 
efficiency nor power is the sole driver of the argument, both the separation 
between distribution and efficiency typical of so much economics and the 
‘romantic voluntarism’ of certain Marxian analyses is avoided, and this is 
crucial for appreciating the role of efficiency-enhancing distribution policies. 
 
3. Applications and extensions 
 
This section employs some stylized facts about firms to illustrate past 
and present applications of the propositions stated in the previous section 
(fig.4).  
Accordingly, the box to the upper left pertains to the classical firm.   
The main feature of the industrial revolution was the rise of the factory, that is, 
the grouping of previously separate branches of trade under one roof. In the 
terms used here, this means that investments were non separable either ex ante 
or ex post, so that they could not profitably stay independently on the market 
either at inception or at realization. As a consequence, inter-group relationships 
were conflictual and the surplus-value realization process was a between-group 
competition push (as shown by the early obsession with increasing the volume 
of production and lowering prices to appropriate market share from 
competitors). As for intra-group relationships, works by Ure (1835), Babbage 
(1832) and Braverman (1974) leave little doubt that they were hierarchical 
(both in the organizational sense that investments were intended to diminish 
the skill content of workers’ jobs, and in the distributional sense that wages 
were fixed at subsistence), and centralized (in the sense that recruitment 
occurred without meaningful outside options from the outset: for example, a 
boy of humble origins from Sheffield was almost certainly bound to end up 
making knives like his father).  
In sum, as the following quotation from Mokyr (2002, p.128, emphasis 
added) makes clear, Marx was not alone in perceiving the impact of historical 
phenomena operating ‘behind the backs’ of individuals so as to cast doubts on 
the unfettered explanatory role of Pareto-efficient exchanges while not 
forgoing analysis of  the workings of an economic logic: ‘For the economist, it 
                                                                                                                                 
the ‘thing’ factor predominates over the human factor, as in relationships between firms or 
states, for example.   18
is a logical puzzle why, in the absence of coercion, workers would voluntarily 
agree to work in factories if doing so reduced their utility. Many workers were 
paid a factory or a coal-mine premium as a compensating differential, and 
workers were provided with benefits such as housing, schooling for their 
children, and even milch cows (…). Insofar as this was inadequate, however, 
factory owners, especially in the countryside, relied on pauper children and 
orphans ‘borrowed’ from workhouses. Beyond that, however, the economic 
logic of the Industrial Revolution implied that workers might end up working 
in factories even if it made them worse off than they were before (though not 
worse off than if they stayed at home). The reason is that opportunity cost of 
many of these potential factory employees was set by what they could earn in 
the cottage industry. This alternative declined rapidly because of factory 
competition and by 1850 was, in most cases, no longer available. The factories, 
by relentlessly driving down the price of manufactured goods, reduced the 
earnings of those working at home and thus forced them (or their offspring) to 
abandon their cottages and seek work in the mills or to emigrate’. 
  Whilst a non literal interpretation of the previous case can be extended 
to contemporary high-volume, low-price mature industries (especially in 
developing countries where ‘free market’ mechanisms are more pristine), the 
box in the middle can instead represent the case of partnerships, with their 
typical non compete clauses, up-or-out promotion rules, flat hierarchies and 
profit-sharing schemes (see Rayan and Zingales, 1998, and Levin and Tadelis, 
2005, for efficiency-based explanations). As a consequence of investments 
which must be undertaken collectively at the beginning but can be realized 
independently (such as collective specialization in a new professional field 
like, say, class action), inter-group relationships are fission-fusion with 
commitment (up-or-out promotion rules, non compete clauses). In turn, the 
latter can be seen as implying a between-group opportunity pull surplus-value 
realization process (profit derives from niche-competition).
17 Flat hierarchies 
and profit sharing, then, are obvious examples of egalitarian intra-group 
relationships, while their decentralized character is due to the relative mobility 
of professionals’ ‘labor markets’. 
Finally, the box to the lower right is occupied by the ‘putting-out 
system’. Since this consists of the assembly of separate parts of the product, 
investments can stay independently in the market at inception but not at 
realization. To the extent that this system was the first step in pushing 
independent crafts out of the market, the surplus-value realization process was 
a within-group competition push (putter-outers’ profits arose from interposing 
                                                 
17 After their detailed analysis of the specialization of lawyers in law firms, Garricano and 
Hubbard (2003) conclude that ‘Lawyers are more likely to work at the same firm with lawyers 
in their own field than with lawyers from any other field’ (p.30).    19
a new figure between independent producers and consumers, while the piece-
rate wage system is an example of subordinates left with the value of a 
truncated investment), in turn generated by fission-fusion without commitment 
inter-group relationships (there was no point in having stable groups, and 
workers typically could sell their produce to multiple ‘putter-outers’). Intra-
group relationships, on the other hand, were hierarchical even in the 
organizational sense, and they were decentralized, as evidenced by the 
following quotation from Marglin (1974, p. 81): ‘The minute specialization 
that was the hallmark of the putting-out system only wiped out one of two 
aspects of workers’ control of production: control over the product. Control of 
the work process, when and how much the worker would exert himself, 
remained with the worker until the coming of the factory’.   
Closer to our times, another example is, for want of a better term, the 
contemporary ‘global’ firm viewed in its simplest version as a relation between 
one manager (the headquarters) and a group of workers (the subsidiaries). As 
in the putting-out system, investment can be undertaken independently at 
inception but must be realized collectively (as implied by the fact that even 
relatively simple products are the result of a myriad of small components made 
in different plants often located in different parts of the world). To the extent 
that the condition given in proposition 3 holds, inter-group relationships are 
fission-fusion without commitment and the surplus-value realization process is 
a within-group competition push (as especially demonstrated by private equity 
firms). On the other hand, intra-group relationships are hierarchical both in the 
organizational sense (as shown by the new forms of separation between 
conception and execution embodied in the growing indifference as to where 
production actually takes place) and in the distributional sense (as confirmed 
by the 25-year long increase in the earning gap between skilled and unskilled 
labor
18). Finally, the super-mobility imposed on relatively unskilled manual or 
intellectual workers means that they are also decentralized.
19  
                                                 
18 Admittedly, all the main explanations of this gap in the systems of the English-speaking 
countries take as their benchmark the equilibrium condition of wages equal to marginal 
productivity (or ability), a procedure which this paper shows to be unqualifiedly accurate only 
in the case of independent production. This is the case whether these explanations point out a 
distance from such a condition due to ill-managed principal-agent relationships (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003), whether they recognize instead a rapprochement due to the increase in the 
‘priced’ (non firm-specific) part of managerial ability (Murphy and Zàbojnik, 2004), or 
whether they document a technologically-driven shift in the equilibrium (Autor, Katz, and 
Kearney, 2006).   
19 For the sake of realism, in a more elaborate version, managers’ investments can be 
interpreted as being of type b (fig.1) with respect to other managers, but since the solution to 
their collective action problem is self-enforcing, they remain of type c with respect to workers. 
Therefore, whilst inter-group relationships among (groups of) managers are fission-fusion with 
commitment and the corresponding surplus-value realization process is a between-group   20
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To conclude this section providing real examples of the proposed 
theoretical framework, the last point to be discussed is the problem of 
institutional change. On the one hand, the industrial revolution and the advent 
of information technology have both been such big pushes that the shift from 
the putting-out system to the classical firm, and that from Keynesian Taylorism 
to the contemporary ‘global’ firm, can be easily accommodated. Indeed, they 
strengthen the evolutionary characterization of the paper because of the 
analogy with the biological concept of ‘punctuated equilibria’ (Eldredge and 
Gould, 1972). As suggested by Mokyr (2002), a dramatic shift in the relative 
importance of human capital vs. physical capital notwithstanding
20, in both 
cases the driving force may have been, at least in part, the impact of 
                                                                                                                                 
opportunity pull, their relationships with workers remains fission-fusion without commitment, 
and the surplus-value realization process remains a within-group competition-push. And, of 
course, the phenomenon is not confined to multinational firms but is part of the general trend 
toward outsourcing and sub-contracting. 
20 Interestingly, Piketty and Saenz (2003) provide evidence that, whilst at the beginning of the 
century the top earners were capital earners, they are now wage earners. Relatedly, as 
emphasized by the new-growth theories, when coupled with imperfect capital markets 
(contractual incompleteness) and the limited individuals’ capacity to accumulate human 
capital, this shift offers the most convincing argument for efficiency-enhancing distribution 
policies in a methodologically individualistic framework.     21
technology on the cost of moving people versus the cost of moving knowledge, 
and in both cases – one can argue – workers’ conditions may have worsened 
although the direction of such movements has been two-way.  
But, on the other hand, other complex determinants such as 
‘ideologically’ and ‘culturally’ driven institutional changes (the unions and the 
stock exchange, for example) have played a comparable role in the period. 
Because knowledge is not only technical but also social, these considerations 
highlight the main theoretical deficiency of the framework proposed, namely, 
the interaction between institutional structures and the associated belief 
systems.  
The complexity of the problem suggests that it should be left to future 
research, but the reason why it should be investigated is obvious. In the 
language of the game-theoretic approaches to institutions (Aoki, 2001, Bowles, 
2004; Greif, 2005; see also North, 1990), inter-group relationships are the 
equilibrium of the (previous generation) game between groups and, at the same 
time, determine the rules of the game within the group and the sustaining 
beliefs system. Intra-group relationships, instead, are the equilibrium of the 
(present generation) game within the group. But, whilst in this paper the rules 
of the game between groups (players, strategies and pay-offs) have been taken 
to be determined by technological conditions, one can also speculate that intra-
group relationships, depending on whether or not they maximize group value, 
may have the effect of either confirming or disrupting the shared beliefs 
motivating the equilibrium play, thus either confirm or inducing a change in 
the rules of the (next generation) game between groups (with only the former 
case being, so to speak, a stable macro-founded institutional equilibrium). 
Methodologically, this acknowledgment of the recursive structure of 
the relevant games may close the causation circle at the root of the approach 
proposed between methodological individualism and holistic structuralism: 
technological conditions (and individuals) affect institutions (inter-group 
relationships), which affect individuals (property rights and beliefs), which 
affect institutions (intra-group relationships), which affect individuals (beliefs 
and property rights), which finally restart the process by affecting institutions 
(inter-group relationships). 
And as regards policy implications, of course, from the results of the 
previous section it follows that exploitation is an obvious candidate for the 
above possibility of a change in beliefs, to which correspond different 
coalitions across groups, different rules of the games between groups and, 
consequently, different inter-group relationships and different surplus-value 
realization processes (the idea is by no means new). As an informal illustration, 
indeed, in the case treated in proposition 1, because of the combination of this 
process with democracy, in Western Europe this has historically taken the form 
of a ‘grand bargain’ among workers, employers and the state. In the terms used   22
here, this has meant that the conflictual nature of inter-group relationships has 
been mitigated to such an extent that between-group competition has been 
impeded in its function of determining the process of group formation and 
extinction (life-time employment and state-sponsored bail outs, for example), 
but not to the point that it has been unable to display the organizational virtues 
of (output) markets thanks to a relatively decentralized price system (recall 
demand falls outside the scope of the paper). In this sense, and at the risk of 
over-simplification, the entire situation can be conceptualized as composed of 
only one super-group, with egalitarian and decentralized intra-group 
relationships implementing a borderline surplus-value realization process 
basically consisting of sharing within the super-group the gains from a 
coordinated between-group opportunity pull (consider the golden rule of wages 
equal to productivity, the welfare state, the patent system, and protection from 
international competition, for example)
21. In the case treated in proposition 3, 
instead, this seems to take the form of increasing support for universal income 
security, with a quite wide range of possible practical implementations (see, for 
instance, Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2005). In terms of the paper, this may 
amount to reversing the condition given in the text so that proposition 2 (in the 
implicit version) applies instead.  
In both cases, to the extent that  proper attention is paid to the 
interaction between the micro-foundations of institutions and the macro-
foundations of individuals, the possibility that the associated distribution 
policies qualify as efficiency-enhancing stems from replacing the original 
conflictual surplus-value realization process with the appropriate common 
interest surplus-value realization process. And, in both cases, assuming that the 
new-group value maximizing change in beliefs does occur (from ‘I earn what I 
produce as measured by my market value, so nobody will follow me in 
changing strategy’ to ‘in different times and places (sectors) people earn a 
possibly different share of what they have contributed to produce, so there will 
be a critical mass of strategy changes’, for example), the ensuing distribution 
struggles do not necessarily raise the collective action problem as usually 
envisaged. From the point of view of workers,  indeed, the same struggles are a 
within-group competition push with respect to employers but, with respect to 
other (groups of) workers, they are in effect a between-group opportunity pull 
                                                 
21Notably, the same ‘super-group’ characterization is even better suited to real communist 
societies, which indeed enjoyed comparable growth in the same period but proved unable to 
adapt to new technological conditions because the absence of political freedom and the grip of 
the state on the economy implied hierarchical and centralized intra-group relationships and a 
consequent within-group competition push surplus value realization process.    23
fuelled by investments which must be performed collectively at inception but 





This paper has shown that joint consideration of the theory of the firm and 
the theory of distribution in light of an investment-based theory of value casts 
doubts on the functioning of a market economy as conventionally conceived.  
The basic reason for this is that, particularly when surplus-value is created 
by cooperation, the logic of exchange among given individuals is not the only 
plausible economic logic, and another one, driven by the evolutionary principle 
of differential, multilevel profit realization, can be conceived.  
The other good news is that these two logics need not be incompatible, for 
they follow from two different but equally powerful tendencies of human 
behavior –that of growing lazy and that of making progress, or aggrandizing. 
Hence, as currently happening in debate about the determinants of the growth 
of knowledge, which logic to embrace is not an issue of right or wrong but 
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